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Abstract
Application of a conventional all-Union per-capita income poverty line for 
1989 shows the incidence of poverty in the Central Asian republics of the 
former USSR to have been far higher than in the European republics. The paper 
investigates this phenomenon, concentrating on Uzbekistan, the largest Central 
Asian republic, and taking the Ukraine as a basis for comparison from among 
the European republics. The analysis is based on 1989 data from the Family 
Budget Survey, a source which has been rightly criticised but at the same time 
has been far from fully exploited. We consider (i) the importance of allowing 
for household size and composition, (ii) the presence and valuation of 
agricultural income in kind, (iii) the distribution of food shares, as an 
alternative measure of living standards. We draw out the implications of the 
analysis for the measurement of poverty and associated issues in post-Union 
Uzbekistan.
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A stylised fact about living standards in the former USSR is that the 
Central Asian republics were, and still are, considerably poorer than other 
republics. Through much of the history of the Union this view was based 
largely on anecdotal reports from the Russian language press and academic 
journals, together with published figures on mean per capita income by 
republic. At the end of the 1980s it appeared to be substantiated by data on 
the distribution of income by republic, based on household surveys, published 
by the USSR central statistical office, Goskomstat. The period of glasnost' 
saw renewed interest in the measurement of poverty, investigation of which had 
been repressed for a long time. Commenting on the 1989 budget survey results, 
Goskomstat noted that 'it is customary to count families with an average per 
capita income of below 75 rubles per month as poor' (1990, p.4, our 
translation); Figure 1 shows the proportion of individuals in each republic 
with per capita income beneath the 75 ruble level, as shown by the 1989 survey 
data. The figures for all four core Central Asian republics of Kyrghyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan exceed 30 percent and are notably 
higher than for all other republics (with the exception of Azerbaidzhan); they 
seem to show that a far greater section of the Central Asian population was 
in poverty (on the above definition) than in the European republics. These 
data have attracted considerable attention from international organisations 
concerned with the transition process in the former USSR. For example, the 
study of the Soviet economy published in 1991 by the IMF, World Bank, OECD and 
EBRD, provides the same information as in our Figure 1 in a table referring 
explicitly to poverty levels by republic (IMF et al, 1991, Table IV.6.14).
In this paper we focus on poverty in Uzbekistan. With 20 million 
inhabitants in 1990 it is (in terms of population) the largest of the Central 
Asian republics and the third largest republic of the former Union. The 
population is predominantly rural, some 60 percent in 1990, and there is a 
consequently high share of total employment that is in agriculture - over one 
third - much of which is devoted to cotton production on irrigated land 
(although the bulk of the country is semi-desert). The age structure is very 
young, with over 40 percent of the population beneath the age of 15 in 1990 - 




























































































between 1979 and 1989.1
With these characteristics, the apparently high incidence of low incomes 
in Uzbekistan relative to much of the former Union may come as no surprise. 
The republic has a socio-economic profile of a less-developed country quite 
different from the European republics. Figure 1 shows the proportion of 
persons in Uzbekistan with incomes beneath the 75 rubles per capita level in 
1989 as being 44 percent, second only to that in Tajikistan. The individuals 
concerned represented 28 percent of all individuals in the former Union with 
per capita income beneath this level, the single largest concentration of low 
incomes in the USSR (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1989, Figure 8.10).
At the same time, the comparison of poverty in the Central Asian 
republics with that in the European republics is a more complex task than a 
casual inspection of Figure 1. We investigate some of the issues using the 
household survey data from 1989 on which Figure 1 is based, taking Ukraine as 
an example of a European republic.2 Although there is historical interest in 
considering differences by republic in living standards, the break-up of the 
USSR means that these differences no longer have relevance for such issues as 
re-distribution of income across the Union. Our use of the data aims to serve 
two other purposes. First, the comparison of Uzbekistan with Ukraine at a 
time when they formed part of the same country with common currency and data 
sheds light on problems of measuring poverty in Central Asia, and we focus on 
issues that are of continuing interest following the collapse of the Union. 
Second, in analysing the data for 1989 we are laying down evidence on living 
standards against which the impact of economic reform in Uzbekistan can be 
judged.
Section 2 describes our sources of information. Principal among these 
is the Family Budget Survey (FBS) of the former USSR. This survey has been 
subject to extensive criticism, which we summarise, but it remains the only 
source of information on most aspects of household incomes and consumption in 
the individual republics at the time of the break-up of the Union. Although 
we do not have access to the survey micro-data, we are able to draw on 
extensive tabulations in the published report for 1989 which until now have 
been largely unused both in Russian language and Western reports. Taking the
1 Data taken from World Bank (1992, pp.418-9).
2 We choose Ukraine in preference to the Russian Federation due to the 




























































































FBS on its own terras with all its defects, there is still, in our view, a 
considerable amount which we can learn from the data, both about the pre­
reform situation and about methodological issues for the measurement of living 
standards during transition.
In Section 3 we consider the implications for poverty measurement of the 
large household sizes in Uzbekistan. The use of a per capita poverty line as 
in Figure 1 makes no allowance for economies of scale in the household, which 
other things equal will have resulted in higher estimates of poverty in 
republics of the former Union with larger average household sizes. Some 
observers have pointed to this as the principal cause of the pattern observed 
in Figure 1 but we conclude that differences in household size and composition 
explained only a small part of the difference in incidence of low per capita 
incomes in Uzbekistan and Ukraine in 1989.
The importance of agriculture in the Central Asian republics implies 
that the issue of agricultural income in kind may be critical, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests this to be the case (e.g. Lubin, 1984). The disequilibrium 
in the goods market which characterised the pre-reform situation means that 
the Goskomstat practice of valuing such income in the FBS at official state 
prices may have resulted in substantial undervaluation. In Section 4 we 
examine the data in the FBS on the importance of agricultural income in kind 
for different household types and at different points in the income 
distribution.
The official poverty line in the USSR at the end of the 1980s was framed 
in terms of income. In Section 5 we move away from measuring living standards 
by income and look at food shares, a commonly used indicator in less-developed 
countries. The tabulations available to us provide distributions of food 
share by per capita income group. These allow a cross-tabulation of "food- 
share poverty" by "income poverty" and they also show whether the comparison 
of Uzbekistan and Ukraine on the basis of low incomes is robust to a switch 
to a basis of high food shares.
Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing the measurement of poverty 
in Uzbekistan in the future, including measures of individual household living 




























































































2. Survey Data in Uzbekistan
The data we use come from two household surveys of the USSR relating to 
1989.3 The first, which we make more use of, is the Family Budget Survey 
(FBS). This operated continuously from the early 1950s until the break-up of 
the Union, collecting information from households on their incomes, 
expenditures, consumption, durable ownership and other characteristics. Some 
90,000 households in the Union were interviewed for the FBS in 1989. The 
second, the March Survey, was held only periodically. It collected 
information on socio-economic characteristics, incomes and durable ownership 
from a sample of about 310,000 households but did not cover expenditure or 
consumption.*
The operation of the FBS was shrouded in secrecy for many years but 
sufficient was known for it to be the subject of considerable criticism both 
inside and outside the USSR. The main reason for this was the sample design 
which left much to be desired. The survey was a quota sample of households 
of persons working in the state sector and on collective farms. This meant 
that a household's probability of selection increased with the number of 
working members, being zero in the case where no member worked. (This would 
appear to have excluded pensioner households, but it seems that some did in 
fact enter the sample.) The quotas favoured heavy industry and did not 
achieve full geographic coverage although a 50 percent increase in sample size 
in 1988 aimed to reduce these problems. The survey was a panel although this 
feature of the design does not appear to be have exploited. There was no 
organised rotation of households and respondents were pressurised to 
participate indefinitely.
These defects are substantial ones and undoubtedly imply that the FBS
3 We draw on more detailed descriptions given in Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992, Chapter 3 and Sources and Methods).
* Although the March Survey report provides numerous tables analysing 
household characteristics by the same ruble income classes as the FBS, the 
number of households or individuals in each income class is never given. In 
principle this information could be recovered by solving sets of linear 
equations implied by the data, for example from the information on the 
composition of each income class by household size which we use in Section 3. 
However, inversion of the relevant matrices did not yield sensible results 
(e.g. some household sizes were estimated to have negative weights). For this 





























































































is a far from satisfactory source for the study of living standards. The 
sample design suggests that households with low incomes may well be under­
represented, which has serious implications for any analysis of poverty with 
the data.5 There is clearly much which should be done to improve the survey 
design so as to monitor living standards adequately in the transition period 
and beyond. However, as far as analysis of the pre-reform period in Central 
Asia is concerned, the researcher is faced with a choice of using the FBS and 
March Survey data in the form that they were collected or of doing nothing, 
and it is in this spirit which we use the data here. Even if the results 
cannot be seen as truly representative, the general picture presented by the 
data and the issues raised by their analysis are, we believe, of value. To 
date, much of the information in the FBS has been under-exploited due to the 
secrecy surrounding the survey results until the late 1980s.6 *
In 1989 the FBS collected information from a total of 3,005 households 
in Uzbekistan, of which two-thirds were households of "workers or employees" 
in state sector enterprises (we refer to these as worker/employees), and one- 
third were households of collective farm workers. This is a smaller sample 
than one would like but is substantially larger than the sample sizes for 
smaller republics in the Union: the planned sample size in 1988 was less than 
2,000 households in nine republics (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Table 
S6). The 1989 sample in Ukraine, the European republic we take for 
comparison, was substantially larger - nearly 17,000 households - again about 
one third of which were collective farm households.
We do not have access to the individual household level micro-data from 
the survey and this severely restricts the types of analysis we can make. The 
results we present are drawn from tabulations in the survey report which was 
published in two volumes, one for worker/employee households and one for 
collective farm households (Goskomstat, 1990). Each table in the two volumes 
is given first for the USSR and then for each republic. Table 1 gives the 
fullest information we have available on income distribution for Uzbekistan 
and Ukraine. The form in which much the data are published is also
5 The sample design of the March Survey was similar but was not a panel.
6 Other sources of information do exist on household living standards
in the USSR, notably surveys of Jewish emigres from the USSR which have been 
used extensively e.g. Ofer and Vinokur (1992). However, besides being 
restricted to a particular socio-economic group these samples do not provide 
sufficiently large samples at the republic level. (The Ofer and Vinokur data 




























































































illustrated by the table; information is often presented in terms of average 
values in eight per capita income classes. Income is gross of taxes and is 
given in the report in terms of the monthly equivalent of annual incomes, 
information on incomes being collected regularly throughout the year through 
repeated interviewing. In principle, income from all sources was included, 
including income from non-state sources, although the surveying effort made 
by Goskomstat may have varied with the income source (as may the veracity of 
respondents' replies).' Notably, given our focus on an agricultural republic, 
income in kind from agriculture was included, valued at state prices.
In the bottom part of the table we show the income distribution data 
separately for worker/employee and collective farm households. The sample 
numbers given above imply that collective farm households were heavily over­
sampled in both Uzbekistan and Ukraine. There appears to have been adjustment 
for this in the tables in the published report which are presented by 
Goskomstat grossed up to population level. The rural nature of the Uzbekistan 
population is reflected in the greater proportion of all individuals in 
collective farm households in the grossed-up figures, relative to Ukraine. 
Note that worker/employee households are far from being exclusively urban and 
the definition of this group includes households of employees on state farms 
as opposed to collective farms. The report of the 1989 March Survey records 
a third of worker/employee households in Uzbekistan living in rural areas 
(Goskomstat, 1990a, pp.20-22). (The rural/urban split is not given in the FBS 
report.)
In the case of Uzbekistan there is a notable difference between the two 
types of household in the incidence of low income, defined as income beneath 
75 rubles per capita. Some 57 percent of individuals living in collective 
farm households are in this category compared to 39 percent of individuals in 
worker/employee households. In the top part of the table we have combined the 
separate data for the two types of household and have interpolated within 
income classes to obtain summary measures of income inequality.8 * These
' Information on earnings given by respondents was substantiated from 
employer records.
8 The availability of the mean income levels within each income class
increases the accuracy of the estimates of inequality indices. The use of the 
means, together with a split of the 0-75 ruble class into two classes, implies 
that the results are considerably more accurate than those given in Atkinson 





























































































measures indicate substantially higher per capita income inequality in 
Uzbekistan than in Ukraine.’
The 75 ruble per capita low income threshold on which we focus is close 
to the all-Union subsistence minimum income level calculated by Goskomstat for 
1989 (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Table UP2). Does it make any sense to 
use the same income poverty line across the whole Union, given variations in 
prices, climate, preferences and average living standards? This of course is 
a question relevant to any large political unit. The official poverty line 
in the USA is the same throughout the country. Measurement of poverty by the 
European Commission in the looser political confederation of the EC applies 
a different poverty line (in money terms) in each member state - 50 percent 
of average national income (more recently, expenditure). Table 1 shows that 
the 75 ruble threshold was almost exactly equal to 50 percent of average per 
capita income in 1989 in Ukraine, while in Uzbekistan 50 percent of the 
national average was less than 50 rubles. Moving to the measure used by the 
European Commission would imply income poverty to be about three times higher 
in Uzbekistan than in Ukraine rather than the seven times indicated by the 
application of the 75 ruble level in both republics. As this illustrates, the 
choice of income threshold would be of considerable importance in any study 
having the primary aim of making conclusions about differences in poverty 
across the former USSR. However, our interest in comparing Uzbekistan with 
Ukraine is largely methodological and for this purpose the 75 ruble line 
serves the purpose.
3. Household Size and Composition
The 75 ruble low income threshold is a per capita income line which 
makes no allowance for economies of scale with household size.10 This implies 
that large household sizes can be expected to be found near the bottom of the 
income distribution, other things being equal. This is brought out by Table 
1 which gives average household size in each income class. The table also 
shows that there are much larger average household sizes in Uzbekistan - 4.9
’ Gini coefficients for comparably defined distributions for the late 
1980s are estimated by Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, Table 5.5) as 0.20 in 
Czechoslovakia (1988), 0.24 in Hungary (1987), and 0.27 in Poland (1989).
10 The same is true of the slightly higher Goskomstat subsistence minimum 




























































































overall compared to 3.0 in Ukraine - a result of the high rate of population 
growth and consequent age structure of the population noted in the 
Introduction. In Figure 2 we show the distribution of household sizes in 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine, distinguishing between worker/employee households and 
collective farm households (the information in this instance is taken from the 
March Survey). The differences are striking, particularly for the collective 
farm households where the modal size in Ukraine is 2 persons but is 7 in 
Uzbekistan.
The use of a per capita threshold means that holding income constant we 
will find more people beneath the threshold in Uzbekistan with its large 
household sizes than in Ukraine where household sizes are smaller. Is this 
the explanation for the apparently much higher incidence of poverty in 
Uzbekistan than in Ukraine? In a similar comparison of Uzbekistan with the 
Russian Federation, the IMF and other international organisations opined that 
differences in household size and composition between the republics were 
indeed the main factor (IMF et al, 1991, vol II p . 155).
Although access to the micro-data is necessary to fully explore this 
issue, the tables in the published report for the FBS do allow partial 
investigation. As far as household size is concerned, the report provides 
information on the distribution of income for different household sizes. If 
we hold household size constant, does the incidence of low incomes in 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine become quite similar? Unfortunately, the tables 
combine all households of size 6 or more into one group, which Figure 2 
indicates is about two-fifths of all worker/employee households in Uzbekistan 
and two-thirds of collective farm households. So we can hold household size 
constant only for the smaller households. (No information on incidence of low 
income by household size is given in the March Survey report.) Figure 3 shows 
that for these households at least, the answer to the question just posed is 
in general negative. The incidence of low incomes, defined as per capita 
income less than 75 rubles per month, rises with household size in both 
republics, as one would expect given the per capita adjustment. But it rises 
much faster in Uzbekistan where the incidence is markedly higher than that in 
Ukraine for every household size greater than 2 in the case of the 
worker/employee households and for all sizes greater than 1 for the collective 
farm households.
The differences in the distributions of household size between the two 




























































































incomes. This is shown by Table 2 where in the final line we estimate what 
would have been the incidence of low incomes in Uzbekistan had the 
distribution of household size in the republic been the same as that in 
Ukraine. In other words we apply the incidence rates by household size for 
Uzbekistan given in Figure 3 to the Ukraine distributions of household size 
given in Figure 2. The overall incidence of low incomes in Uzbekistan falls 
by about one-third but we are left with the conclusion that the bulk of the 
difference between Uzbekistan and Ukraine in incidence of low incomes defined 
on a per capita basis cannot be explained by the larger household sizes in the 
Central Asian republic."
The other part of the IMF et al thesis was that differences in household 
composition are important. One aspect of composition is the number of wage 
earners in the household. This could be expected to be important in 
Uzbekistan due to the impact of population growth on working opportunities. 
Population growth produced not just large household sizes in Uzbekistan but 
it was not matched pre-reform by growth in jobs. Central Asia came to be 
viewed within the USSR as an area of "labour surplus” (eg. Marnie, 1992). The 
growth in the rural working age population in Uzbekistan between 1979 and 1989 
was particularly notable, rising by 38 percent (Demooraficheskii ezheaodnik 
SSSR. Goskomstat, 1990, pp33-35, 39-41). As a result there were not only 
greater numbers of children to support in Uzbekistan, but a significant 
section of the working age population was classified as "dependent", i.e. 
without income from state employment, collective farms, or private plots, and 
not in receipt of a state pension or grant. This applied to 12.1 percent of 
the working age population in 1989, compared to 5.6 percent in the Ukraine 
IStatisticheskii press-builleten'. no.13, 1990, pp78-79). Lack of employment 
opportunities may be one reason for the relatively low participation rate of 
women of working age in Uzbekistan in state sector and collective farm 
employment of about 60 percent in 1989, compared to about 80 percent in 
Ukraine, although cultural factors and family responsibilities may be other 
factors (Marnie, 1992, p .171).
Given this evidence one would expect to see lower average number of 1*
11 In these estimates we are applying to all Ukraine households sizes of 
6 or more the average Uzbekistan incidence rates for households of size 6+, 
a calculation which may be particularly affected by the rates for the larger
household sizes within the 6+ group. However, the discrepancy introduced as 
a result in the overall incidence rates in line 3 of Table 2 is small since 




























































































workers per household recorded in the 1989 survey data for Uzbekistan than for 
Ukraine, holding household size constant. ("Workers" here include both 
worker/employees and collective farm workers.) Figure 4 confirms this to be 
the case but the differences are not very great and appear insufficient to 
explain the markedly higher incidence in Figure 3 of low per capita incomes 
in Uzbekistan holding constant household size. (The source in this case is 
the March Survey since the FBS report does not contain the necessary 
information.) It should be remembered that large household sizes, where the 
differences in the average number of workers are large for worker/employee 
households, are rare in Ukraine. (When we do not control for differences in 
household size the average number of workers per household is in fact higher 
in Uzbekistan, especially for collective farm households, due to the 
differences in the distributions of household size illustrated in Figure Z.)u
The treatment of household size and composition is of obvious importance 
for future measurement of poverty in Uzbekistan, particularly in view of the 
shape of the distribution of household size. Low fixed costs of housing pre­
reform may have reduced economies of scale in large households but many would 
argue that the lack of any allowance for scale economies is going too far. 
If scale economies do exist, the per capita adjustment will not only 
exaggerate the number of persons considered poor but it will also result in 
the composition of the poor being biased towards larger household sizes.13 
This will have implications for the design of a 'safety net' aimed at 
protecting the living standards of those with low incomes during economic 
reform (Atkinson, 1992). For example, family benefits for households with 
large numbers of children could get a disproportionate amount of attention 
from policy makers in Uzbekistan.
13 Among other explanations for differences in the incidence of lower 
incomes between Uzbekistan and Ukraine are wage levels. The 1989 March Survey 
data show 20 percent of individuals working in the state sector in Uzbekistan 
earning less than 90 rubles a month compared to 8 percent in Ukraine (Atkinson 
and Micklewright, 1992, Table UE6). Since our interest in comparing 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine is largely methodological we do not consider such 
factors further.
13 The March Survey report shows that households with 6 or more members 
made up half of urban worker/employee households in Uzbekistan beneath the 75 
ruble per capita line in 1989, 2 in 3 of rural worker/employee households in 
the same position and 7 in 10 of collective farm households (Goskomstat, 




























































































4. Income in Kind from Agricultural Plots
The importance of the private agricultural plot to household living 
standards and to total agricultural output is something that repeatedly 
concerned scholars of Soviet life. Cultivation of the private plot was a form 
of private enterprise that was tolerated by the state. Individuals were free 
to sell produce on markets relatively free from controls or to keep and 
consume it within the household. This activity is of particular interest in 
Uzbekistan with its predominately rural population and large agricultural 
sector. Rumer (1989, ppl25-6) reported private plots to have accounted for 
46 percent of meat production in the republic in 1982 and 40 percent of milk 
and vegetable production. Lubin (1984, ppl85-6) reports even higher figures 
which also suggest private agriculture to have been substantially more 
important in Uzbekistan than in other parts of the USSR. At the same time, 
concrete data on the importance of private agriculture to individual 
households has been hard to come by; Matthews (1986), in his account of 
poverty in the USSR, referred to the "mystery of the private plot" (p.42).
In this section we consider what the FBS and March Survey data suggests 
about the importance of private plots to household incomes in Uzbekistan. The 
March Survey shows the proportion of collective farm households and of rural 
worker/employee households with plots to be very high, 97 percent and 83 
percent respectively (unfortunately no figure is given for urban 
worker/employee households). Almost identical proportions are found in the 
Ukraine data but plots are substantially smaller in Uzbekistan. Median plot 
size is in the interval 0.11-0.15 hectares for collective farm households in 
Uzbekistan compared to 0.36-0.40 in Ukraine. Medians for rural 
worker/employee households are in the intervals 0.07-0.10 hectares and 0.21- 
0.25 hectares respectively (Goskomstat, 1990a, pp.389, 511). The smaller 
sizes in Uzbekistan may reflect more use of more highly productive irrigated 
land. On the other hand, Rumer (1989) argues that population pressure in 
Uzbekistan has squeezed the availability of land for private plots.
As we noted in Section 2, income in kind from plots was included in the 
annual income concept which is behind the monthly income figures presented in 
the published FBS report. One reason for considering the data on plots in 
more detail is that Goskomstat valued plot production consumed within the 
household at official list prices in state retail outlets. There is 




























































































retail outlets in the Soviet economy pre-reform, including evidence from 
Uzbekistan {Lubin, 1984). This often resulted in much higher prices in other 
types of outlet, including legal collective farm markets in which collective 
farm households could sell produce from their private plots. By way of 
illustration, Table 3 gives information on prices of food in different outlets 
in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, and Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, in 
May 1989. The figures cannot be taken as representative of prices throughout 
the two republics, and in particular we would expect the collective farm 
market prices to be much higher in urban areas where produce was in less 
supply. Nevertheless the size of some of the differences is notable. The 
correct valuation of produce consumed within the household is the opportunity 
cost of consumption, which in this case could be viewed as the prices ruling 
in collective farm markets.1* This suggests that there may have been 
considerable undervaluation of this form of income in the FBS, although the 
problem will not have affected uniformly the data for all households with plot 
produce.
Figure 5 shows by income range the average share of total recorded 
income in the FBS accounted for by the cash value of all plot produce. (This 
includes both produce which is sold as well as that consumed within the 
household but the survey report shows that the latter is far more important.) 
The importance of plot income for collective farm households is striking and 
broadly similar in all income classes, around 20 percent in Uzbekistan and 25 
percent in Ukraine. (The figures for collective farm households in Uzbekistan 
in the upper income ranges should be treated with caution; the sample size and 
the shape of the income distribution imply that they must be based on only a 
handful of households.) A rather different picture emerges for 
worker/employee households. Plot income is less important in the aggregate 
reflecting the lower incidence of ownership and the smaller plot sizes. 
However, whereas less than 5 percent of income is recorded as coming from 
plots for all income classes in Ukraine and for higher income classes in 
Uzbekistan, it is notable that about 15 percent of income is from this source 
for the low income group of 0-75 rubles in Uzbekistan, an income class that 
contains nearly two-fifths of the population in worker/employee households.
What impact would under-valuation of plot produce have on the income 14
14 The valuation is in practice more complicated since some goods were 
unobtainable even on collective farm markets. Lubin (1984, ppl87-8) also 




























































































data? Assume for sake of argument that all plot income was under-valued by 
Goskomstat by 50 percent. If this were the case, mean income of individuals 
in collective farm households in the 50-75 ruble range would rise from the 
figures of 62 and 65 rubles respectively for Uzbekistan and Ukraine given in 
Table 1 to 78 and 80 rubles. Considerable numbers of individuals in the 50-75 
ruble range would no longer be classified as "low income". Undervaluation of 
plot income may have significantly exaggerated the picture of poverty in 
Uzbekistan among collective farm households (applying the conventional poverty 
line), and to a lesser extent among worker/employee households as well, 
especially those in rural areas with access to plots. (A further implication 
is that poverty among worker/employee households in Uzbekistan relative to 
that in Ukraine was overstated.) Poverty may be less concentrated on rural 
households than the data seem to suggest. This appears to confirm the first­
hand anecdotal evidence on living standards of writers such as Lubin (1984) 
who have noted the relatively advantageous position of many rural households 
in Uzbekistan.
These findings have implications for measurement of living standards in 
Uzbekistan and for the design of social policy. As regards the former, the 
importance of recorded income in kind from agriculture, even when undervalued, 
suggests that the survey effort made in the past to monitor this source should 
certainly continue (we have drawn on only a small fraction of the FBS tables 
relating to private plots). However, that effort should be concentrated more 
than in the past on obtaining a reasonable valuation of income in kind, 
something that requires better monitoring of actual consumer prices than 
occurred in the pre-reform period. The importance of plot production may 
increase sharply with economic reform in the short-run. Falling average 
living standards in Uzbekistan can be expected to lead to increased reliance 
on home-production of food, something found in several other former socialist 
countries in transition (Rose and Tikhomirov, 1993). In addition, government 
policy in Uzbekistan during 1989-91 is said to have led to substantial 
increases in the number and size of private plots (Mamatkazin, 1991). Social 
policy needs to recognise the difficulty of targeting support via a means-test 
when a substantial proportion of the population, including those outside 
formal agriculture as a primary occupation, have income in kind which is 
difficult to measure and seasonal by nature. Correct measurement of such 
income is necessary not only to allocate resources at the individual household 




























































































have the most need for support.
5. Food Shares
To this point we have considered whether adjustment of recorded income 
would alter the picture of the amount of poverty as defined on an income 
basis. In this section we consider a different indicator of living standards 
- the share of food expenditure in total income. This is a commonly used 
indicator in less developed countries and seems a useful measure to consider 
in the case of Uzbekistan, not least so as to record the pre-reform levels of 
household welfare that it indicates.
One reason for expecting some difference between food share and per 
capita income as indicators of living standards is the evidence from other 
countries that suggests a household's food share to be a decreasing function 
of household size, when controlling for per capita income (e.g. Deaton, 1981). 
If this is the case, a food share measure of living standards allows for some 
economies of scale unlike the per capita income measure we have discussed to 
date.
The top half of Figure 6 shows the distribution of food shares recorded 
in the FBS data for 1989, taking worker/employee and collective farm 
households together. (These are distributions of households, not of 
individuals.) The distributions for Uzbekistan and Ukraine are rather 
different; high food shares were very much more common in 1989 in Uzbekistan, 
which would seem to be clear confirmation of lower living standards in that 
republic. Nearly a quarter of households in Uzbekistan had a food share 
exceeding 50 percent compared with little more than 5 percent in Ukraine. The 
median food share lies in the range 40-45 percent in Uzbekistan but in the 
range 30-35 percent in Ukraine.
The bottom half of the figure shows the average food share in each per 
capita income class in the two republics, distinguishing between 
worker/employee and collective farm households. As one would expect, food 
appears to have an income elasticity less than unity - the average shares 
decline with per capita income class. For example, the mean share for 
worker/employee households in Uzbekistan declines from 45 percent for the 
income class 50-75 rubles to 35 percent in the class 150-175 rubles. Despite 
the big differences between Uzbekistan and Ukraine in the overall distribution 




























































































income class are very similar. This suggests that the big differences in per 
capita income between the two republics is doing much of the work in 
explaining the differences in the food share distributions.
Does low income always imply high food share? Besides giving the mean 
shares, the FBS report also provides information on the distribution of food 
share within each income class shown in Figure 6, and we give this in Table 
4 for the Uzbekistan households. As one would expect there is significant 
variation around the mean values. For example, nearly a fifth of 
worker/employee households in Uzbekistan with per capita income of 50-75 
rubles have food shares of less than 35 percent - close to the mean value for 
the 150-175 ruble class - while another fifth have shares of 55 percent of 
more - in excess of the mean for the 0-50 ruble class.
To further illustrate the variation of food share within income class 
we define a food share of 50 percent or more as "high". The choice is of 
course arbitrary; it is in fact close in both republics to the mean share for 
households with income less than 75 rubles per capita, the commonly taken low 
income poverty line.ls Table 5 cross-classifies the Uzbekistan households by 
high food share and low income, where the latter is defined as before as less 
than 75 rubles per capita. 44 percent of low income worker/employee 
households and 52 percent of low income collective farm households have high 
food shares. (The figures for Ukraine, not shown in the table, are 
interestingly somewhat lower, only 32 percent overall of low income households 
have high food shares.) Among the households with high food shares, 42 
percent of worker/employee households and 25 percent of collective farm 
households are not classified as having low income. The degree of overlap 
between low income and high food share is sensitive to the definitions of 
these categories. Nevertheless, the general message of Table 5 is that the 
alternative indicator of living standards offered by the food share may lead 
to a significant change in the composition of the group of households 
considered poor. This suggests caution before basing the design of the safety 
net during economic reform on a single indicator of living standards.
One feature of the food share data is that even when we control for 
income class, the collective farm households often have somewhat higher shares
ls This level may be compared to figures of 56 and 51 percent 
respectively for the share of food in the 'current' and 'prospective' minimum 
budgets calculated in the 1960s by Sarkisyan and Kutznetsova (1967) which 
received considerable attention. (See Matthews, 1986, Table 1.1, p.20, and 




























































































than the worker/employee households. For example, Table 4 shows that the 
proportion of collective farm households with high food shares (50 percent or 
more) is greater in the four income classes up to and including 100-125 rubles 
(classes that contain nearly 90 percent of all collective farm households). 
Given the larger sizes of these households compared to those of the 
worker/employees, this is the reverse of what one would expect from the 
assumption that conditional on per capita income, the food share is a 
declining function of household size. The lower food shares for the 
worker/employees may reflect worse access to food in conditions of shortage 
prevailing pre-reform. This suggests that the usual interpretation of high 
food shares implying lower welfare may need to be qualified for collective 
farm households.
Another problem with the food share as a welfare indicator is suggested 
by the discussion in Section 4 of the valuation of income in the form of 
agricultural production consumed within the household. Assuming this also 
enters the definition of food expenditure, any undervaluation will bias 
downwards the food shares of households with this form of income.16 Given 
that the collective farm households have more income from this source, it 
would seem that correct measurement of this type of income would push the food 
share values for the collective farm households even higher above those of the 
worker/employee households.
6. Conclusions
Was Uzbekistan indeed characterised by high poverty pre-reform, relative 
to European republics of the Union, as suggested by data on the distribution 
of per capita income? Evidence from the 1989 Family Budget Survey (FBS) which 
we have presented supports this view. The large household sizes in Uzbekistan 
does not seem to be a major factor. With the Ukraine distribution of 
households sizes, the overall number of low income individuals in Uzbekistan 
would have fallen but only by about a third. Food shares were considerably 
higher on average in Uzbekistan.
The substantive question of relative poverty rates in Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine has occupied us less than the methodological issues surrounding the 
use of the FBS data to measure living standards. In exploring these issues
16 Put another way, re-valuation would add the same amount to both 




























































































we focused principally on nominal income data so as to shed light on an 
existing picture of poverty in Uzbekistan which was based on this measure. 
We considered food shares as an alternative indicator but interpretation of 
both nominal incomes and food shares is difficult if prices are not uniform 
across households, and there is considerable evidence that this was far from 
the case. Similarly, changes over time in these measures are difficult to 
interpret without a reliable price index. One may attempt to avoid such 
pricing problems by considering information on consumption. The FBS contains 
detailed information on consumption of different food items and purports also 
to provide information on the nutritional value of food consumed, with tables 
in the survey report on per capita calorie and protein intake by income level. 
We have resisted the temptation to use these data since the definitions of 
different food items are unclear as are the methods for calculating 
nutritional content. With further information on the survey technique, these 
may well be worthwhile indicators to explore.1'
Proposing further use of the survey data supposes that they are of 
sufficient value to merit analysis. Future analysis, as well as that 
undertaken in this paper, is open to question due to the unsatisfactory nature 
of the pre-reform FBS design. One of our aims has been to air some of the 
issues relevant to design of household surveys which can more appropriately 
monitor the reform process. A proper geographic basis for a sampling so as 
to include all household types irrespective of the number of working members 
is a high priority. In particular, the presence in the survey of the 
unemployed and the retired must be ensured. We have also drawn attention to 
the valuation of agricultural production consumed within the household. Price 
reform may eventually mean that the distinction between state and free-market 
prices no longer applies but the importance of this type of income source in 
a largely rural agricultural republic demands that there be careful surveying 
and valuation. Finally, we note that for all its faults, the pre-reform FBS 
was a panel survey (albeit with no planned rotation of households), and this 
aspect of its design seems never to have been exploited. Who gains and who 
loses from economic reform are important questions and panel data have much 
to offer when seeking the answers.
” A still broader analysis might include other indicators of living 
standards computed with aggregate data, such as infant mortality. (McAuley 
(1992) considers such aggregate measures for Uzbekistan and other Central 
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roubles nos. percent per cap. household
per month (millions) individuals monthly size
per capita income
0-50 3.196 16.0 37.40 7.62
50-75 5.541 27.7 61.28 6.52
75-100 4.546 22.7 85.89 5.46
100-125 2.825 14.1 111.84 4.40
125-150 1.670 8.3 135.90 3.84
150-175 0.937 4.7 162.59 3.22
175-200 0.535 2.7 186.11 3.06
200-225 0.311 1.6 !
225-250 0.178 0.9* 257.40 2.10
250 + 0.277 1.4
total 20.017 100.0 92.01
Gini coefficient = 0.287 
Decile ratio = 3.68
UKRAINE
av. av.
roubles nos. percent per cap. household
per month (millions) individuals monthly size
per capita income
0-50 0.258 0.5 45.73 4.15
50-75 2.833 5.5 65.25 4.03
75-100 7.315 14.2 89.06 3.82
100-125 9.787 19.0 113.59 3.53
125-150 9.363 18.2 137.30 3.35
150-175 7.415 14.4 161.60 3.02
175-200 5.190 10.1 186.49 2.82
200-250 5.777 11.2 257.89 2.12
250 + 3.562 6.9
total 51.500 100.0 151.84
Gini coefficient = 0.225 





































































































0-50 1.987 13.8 36.36
50-75 3.539 24.7 60.91
75-100 3.230 22.5 86.10
100-125 2.172 15.1 112.30
125-150 1.390 9.7 135.39
150-175 0.820 5.7 162.39
175-200 0.486 3.4 185.77
200-225 0.290 2.0
225-250 0.169 1.2 258.12
250 + 0.270 1.9
total 14.352 100.0 98.20
CO LLECTIVE FARMS
av.
roubles nos. percent per cap.
per month (millions) individuals monthly
per capita income
0-50 1.209 21.3 39.11
50-75 2.002 35.3 61.92
75-100 1.317 23.2 85.39
100-125 0.653 11.5 110.32
125-150 0.280 4.9 138.45
150-175 0.117 2.1 163.98
175-200 0.049 0.9 189.55
200-225 0.022 0.4
225-250 0.009 0.2 243.69
250+ 0.008 0.1






















































































































roubles nos. percent per cap. household
per month (millions) individuals monthly size
per capita income
0-50 0.214 0.5 46.06 3.83
50-75 2.351 5.7 65.32 3.89
75-100 5.997 14.5 89.19 3.70
100-125 7.941 19.2 113.76 3.47
125-150 7.528 18.2 137.30 3.32
150-175 5.914 14.3 161.58 3.03
175-200 4.095 9.9 186.44 2.82
200-250 4.550 11.0 256.73 2.08
250 + 2.771 6.7 I
total 41.360 100.0 150.72
CO LLECTIVE FARMS
av. av.
roubles nos. percent per cap. household
per month (millions) individuals monthly size
per capita income
0-50 0.044 0.4 44.14 5.72
50-75 0.483 4.8 64.94 4.74
75-100 1.318 13.0 88.45 4.38
100-125 1.845 18.2 112.85 3.80
125-150 1.835 18.1 137.30 3.47
150-175 1.501 14.8 161.71 2.99
175-200 1.095 10.8 186.71 2.81
200-250 1.227 12.1 262.07 2.25
250+ 0.791 7.8




























































































Sources and Notes to Table 1:
Sources: (1) FBS 1989 Report vol I pp. 13, 37, 43, vol II pp.3, 23, 35, (2) 
Kommunist. Uzhekistana no. 11, 1990, (3) Solsial'noe razvitie SSSR 1989, p -119
Notes:
1. Despite distinguishing separately the 0-50 and 50-75 rubles classes in many 
tables, the FBS report, source (1), combines the two in the tables giving the 
numbers of individuals in each class (vol I, p .13, and vol II, p.3). In the 
case of Uzbekistan, we have been able to find this information for both 
worker/employee and collective farm households in source (2) which also gives 
the numbers separately for 200-225 and 225-250 rubles. For Ukraine, we found 
information for the number of individuals in the 0-50 and 50-75 ruble ranges 
only for the two types of household combined (source (3)) and we have assumed 
that the same relative proportions apply for both household types.
2. Figures for mean per capita income in each range are not published and we 
have estimated them by dividing mean total income in each range by mean 
household size. Note that these means are not given separately for the 200- 
250 and 250+ ranges.
3. Inequality indices for the overall distributions were estimated using the 
INEQ package written by F Cowell, LSE. Grouping assumption was Pareto and the 
top interval was also assumed Pareto; preliminary estimates without using the 
class means were made to obtain an estimate of the means of the 200-225 and 
225-250 ranges (200-250 in the case of Ukraine). The mean for the unbounded 
range 250+ was then estimated using these preliminary estimates and the mean 
calculated from the published figures as described above for the whole 200+ 
interval. These estimates were then treated as data (along with the other 
calculated means) when estimating the inequality indices (to obtain 






























































































Accounting for the Effect of Differences 
in the Distribution of Household Size
Percent of individuals of each household type 






UZBEKISTAN 38.5 56.6 43.6
UKRAINE 5.2 5.2 6.0
UZBEKISTAN
with Ukraine distribution 
of household sizes
24.9 41.6 29.6
Source: The figures in first two lines are taken from Table 1. The figures 
in the last line are calculated using the "low income" (less than 75 rubles) 
incidence rates of Figure 3 for Uzbekistan and the distributions of household 
size for Ukraine in Figure 2 (together with information on the average 
household size of households with 9 or more members taken from the March 











































































































Potatoes 18 50 18 113
Cabbage 70 125 36 86
Onions 45 160 30 87
Meat 190 500 190 -
Milk (per 
litre)
24 - 28 60
Eggs (per 
10)
80 118 90 213





























































































Distribution of Food Shares by Income Class in Uzbekistan
WORKER/EMPLOYEE HOUSEHOLDS
income Food Share greater than or equal to (%)
(rubles
per capita) 25 30 35 40
0-50 99.0 99.0 95.9 90.5
50-75 99.7 98.3 81.8 68.1
75-100 99.0 91.8 78.7 60.5
100-125 91.8 84.0 70.2 49.6
125-150 92.5 75.0 54.3 30.1
150-175 90.0 65.0 48.3 31.3
175-200 77.8 53.5 32.8 12.0
200+ 83.8 57.8 35.0 21.6
All 93.5 82.0 66.3 49.3
0-75 99.5 98.5 86.2 75.2
75+ 91.4 76.3 59.4 40.3
45 50 55 60 65 70
80.1 66.5 36.2 26.1 14.6 8.0
50.0 33.6 18.0 9.8 6.1 2.3
38.0 20.3 12.2 6.3 2.8 1.1
27.9 13.0 4.6 1.4 1.4 1.0
17.4 5.4 3.5 2.0 1.7 0.6
18.5 6.3 5.2 3.3 2.1 0.0
4.5 4.5 3.8 0.7 0.7 0.0
9.1 4.7 2.4 0.9 0.9 0.0
32.7 19.6 10.7 6.0 3.6 1.5
59.5 44.0 23.7 14.9 8.8 4.1
23.3 11.1 6.1 2.9 1.8 0.6
COLLECTIVE FARM HOUSEHOLDS
income Food Share greater than or equal to (%)
(rubles
per capita) 25 30 35 40
0-50 95.1 94.7 92.9 90.7
50-75 98.9 97.0 89.8 72.9
75-100 99.0 92.1 83.7 65.0
100-125 94.7 85.1 65.8 45.8
125-150 94.7 76.3 50.0 26.3
150-175 100.0 80.0 64.0 60.0
175-200 83.3 75.0 50.0 33.3
200+ 66.6 33.3 22.2 0.0
All 96.9 91.1 81.2 66.1
0-75 97.5 96.2 90.9 79.3
75+ 96.2 85.7 70.9 ^2.1
45 50 55 60 65 70
83.1 68.8 55.8 48.2 36.5 25.3
56.7 41.8 25.8 17.6 9.6 5.9
43.9 24.2 15.8 9.4 5.5 2.5
30.9 14.2 6.3 4.5 3.6 1.8
10.5 5.2 5.2 2.6 2.6 0.0
36.0 20.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
50.6 35.3 24.0 17.7 11.9 7.4
66.2 51.5 36.5 28.6 19.2 12.9
34.0 18.2 10.6 6.1 4.0 1.7
Source: FBS 1989 Report vol I pp.96-97 and vol II pp. 90-91.





























































































High Food Shares versus Low Income. Uzbekistan
"High Food Share": 50% or more of household income spent on food 
"Low Income”: monthly household income less than 75 rubles per capita







no 88.9% 11.1% 100.0%
Low 82.0% 41.9% 74.1%
Income
466 366 832
yes 56.0% 44.0% 100.0%
18.0% 58.1% 25.9%
2,582 630 3,212





no 339 75 414
Low 81.8% 18.2% 100.0%
Income 61.3% 24.8% 48.5%




all 64.7% 35.3% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Tables 1 and 4
Note: the distributions in this table are of households, not of individuals. 
The distribution of income by households is derived from Table 1 by dividing 






























































































Proportion of Individuals with Monthly Income 































































































































Distribution of Household Size
Worker/Employee households
Collective Farm households
l— j Uzbekistan mvi Ukraine











































































































Incidence of Low Incomes bv Household Size










































































































Average Number of Workers bv Household Size

































































































Proportion of Income from Private Agricultural Plots
income (monthly roubles per capita)


















































































































Distribution of Food Shares 
and Average Food Shares bv Income Class
Distribution of Food Share: All Households
Average Food Share b y  Per Capita Income Class
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